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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
BALLARD V. STATE: A DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT, "YOU 
MIND IF I NOT SAY NO MORE AND JUST TALK TO AN 
ATTORNEY ABOUT THIS," WAS AN UNAMBIGUOUS AND 
UNEQUIVOCAL INVOCATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL, WHICH 
REQIDRED THE INTERROGATION TO CEASE AND 
RENDERED INADMISSIBLE ALL STATEMENTS OBTAINED 
THEREAFTER. 
By: Kayleigb Toth 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the defendant's statement, 
"You mind if I not say no more and just talk to an attorney about this," 
was an invocation of the defendant's right to counsel. Ballard v. State, 
420 Md. 480, 24 A.3d 96 (2011). Specifically, the court held that a 
reasonable police officer would have concluded that the defendant's 
statement was an unambiguous and unequivocal request to speak to an 
attorney. Id. at 491, 24 A.3d at 102. 
On December 27, 2007, police took Warren Lee Ballard ("Ballard") 
into custody after they discovered a murder victim's cell phone SIM card 
in his possession. Police administered proper Miranda warnings, which 
Ballard waived, before Detective Kaiser began a video-taped 
interrogation. During the interrogation, Ballard said to Detective Kaiser, 
"You mind if I not say no more and just talk to an attorney about this." 
Detective Kaiser responded by stating, "What benefit is that going to 
have?" Ballard replied, "I'd feel more comfortable with one." Despite 
this exchange, Detective Kaiser continued the interrogation and Ballard 
eventually made incriminating statements revealing his involvement in 
the murder. 
Ballard filed a motion to suppress the incriminating statements from 
his interrogation arguing his initial statement to Detective Kaiser 
unequivocally and unambiguously invoked his right to counsel. 
However, the Circuit Court for Wicomico County denied Ballard's 
motion to suppress on the basis that his statement was ambiguous, 
equivocal, and did not sufficiently invoke his right to counsel. Thus, 
Detective Kaiser was not required to cease questioning. Ballard then 
filed a motion to reconsider the suppression ruling. During argument on 
the motion to reconsider, the circuit court listened to Ballard's recorded 
interview with Detective Kaiser. The court again denied Ballard's 
motion to suppress relying on the context, inflection, and tone of 
Ballard's statement rather than the typed words on paper. The court 
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found that Detective Kaiser properly continued questioning. Ballard 
subsequently proceeded to trial on an agreed statement of facts and the 
court found him guilty of second-degree murder and lesser charges. 
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland agreed that the 
statement at issue was an ambiguous and equivocal statement that failed 
to invoke Ballard's right to counsel. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted Ballard's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider whether his 
statement was sufficient to invoke the right to counsel. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by recognizing 
that to invoke the right to counsel, the accused must make the request in a 
manner that a reasonable police officer would interpret to be a desire to 
speak with an attorney. Ballard, 420 Md. at 490, 24 A.3d at 102 (citing 
Davis v. Us., 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)). The court further explained 
that the interrogation must stop if at any time the individual states that he 
wants an attorney. Ballard, 420 Md. at 489, 24 A.3d at 101 (citing 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966)). The purpose for this 
"bright-line" prohibition against continued questioning is to prevent 
authorities from badgering, over-reaching, or wearing down an accused to 
the point at which he incriminates himself despite his earlier request for 
counsel. Ballard, 420 Md. at 489,24 A.3d at 101 (citing Smith v. Ill., 469 
U.S. 91, 98 (1984)). 
The court proceeded to compare Ballard's statement to statements 
made in prior cases that were deemed insufficient invocations of the right 
to counsel. Ballard, 420 Md. at 491-92, 24 A.3d at 103. Specifically, the 
court discussed that a reasonable police officer could conclude that the 
statement, "Where's my lawyer?," merely reflected the suspect's 
curiosity concerning the location or appointment of his lawyer. Id. (citing 
Matthews v. State, 106 Md. App. 725, 737-38, 666 A.2d 912, 917 
(1995)). In addition, the court reasoned that the statement, "Maybe I 
should talk to a lawyer," inferred only that the suspect might want a 
lawyer, which does not require cessation of questioning. Ballard, 420 
Md. at 492,24 A.3d at 103 (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 462). Similarly, the 
statement, "Should I get a lawyer," also constituted an ineffective 
assertion of the right to counsel. Ballard, 420 Md. at 492, 24 A.3d at 103 
(citing Minehan v. State, 147 Md. App. 432, 443-44, 809 A.2d 66, 72 
(2002)). Unlike these statements, the court held that Ballard's statement, 
"You mind if I not say no more and just talk to an attorney about this," 
was an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of a defendant's right to 
counsel, and the trial court erroneously denied Ballard's motion to 
suppress. Ballard, 420 Md. at 494,24 A.3d at 104-05. 
After examining the content and format of Ballard's statement, the 
court found that "You mind if. .. " was similar to an accused stating that 
he would rather have an attorney, which courts previously held was an 
unambiguous assertion. Ballard, 420 Md. at 493, 24 A.3d at 104 (citing 
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State v. Harris, 305 S.W.3d 482 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)). The court 
interpreted "You mind if ... " as a colloquialism in this context to mean 
that Ballard's statement was a polite expression seeking to determine if 
Detective Kaiser "mind[ ed]" if Ballard spoke to an attorney rather than 
seeking his permission. Ballard, 420 Md. at 493, 24 A.3d at 103. Even if 
taken for its literal meaning, a reasonable police officer could only 
interpret Ballard's statement as unquestionably asking for a lawyer, 
simply doing so in deferential terms. Jd. at 493, 24 A.3d at 103-04. 
While the court's holding did not require a suspect to "speak with the 
discrimination of an Oxford don," the suspect must articulate a statement 
that a reasonable officer would construe to be a request for counsel. 
Ballard, 420 Md. at 490,24 A.3d at 102 (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 459). 
The court suggested that, "good police practice" would include asking 
clarifying questions when a suspect makes an ambiguous reference to an 
attorney. Ballard, 420 Md. at 490, 24 A.3d at 102 (citing Davis, 512 U.S. 
at 461). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded its analysis by stating 
that had a reasonable police officer interpreted Ballard's statement as a 
vague assertion of the right to counsel, his follow up remarks would 
resolve the ambiguity. Ballard, 420 Md. at 494, 24 A.3d at 104. The 
court considered Ballard's second statement, "I'd feel more comfortable 
with one," in response to the officer asking why he wanted a lawyer, to 
clarify any doubt as to the defendant's desire to speak with counsel. Jd. 
However, the court emphasized that Ballard's first statement, on its own 
without further explanation, represented an unambiguous and 
unequivocal desire to speak with counsel that should have ended the 
interrogation. Jd. 
In Ballard, the Court of Appeals of Maryland broadened the 
protections given to suspects in custodial interrogations. Practitioners 
must pay particular attention to statements made by suspects during 
interrogations, taking into consideration colloquialisms attendant to the 
English language in order to distinguish between ambiguous and 
unambiguous requests for counsel. In reaching its decision, the Ballard 
court acknowledged the need to protect defendants who, under the stress 
and intimidation of an interrogation, experience difficulty speaking 
assertively and use equivocal terms unintentionally. Since the ultimate 
goal of police officers and prosecutors is to acquire admissible evidence, 
their failure to clarify a suspect's statements could result in a reversed 
conviction and remanded trial. Not all criminal suspects are aware of the 
intricacy of the protections provided to them and Ballard burdens all 
parties with the task of guaranteeing these protections. 
